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STUDIES IN THE MIND OF ROMANTICISM

I. ROMANTIC MOTIVES OF CONDUCT IN CONCRETE DEVELOPMENT—*Continued*

On September 11, 1800, he arrives in Würzburg. He describes the town and the Catholic customs and ceremonies with many expressions of impatience. He prefers "the discourse of a priest or a poem by Gellert." Nothing could give a clearer picture of the retarded state of his literary education than his admiration for a poem by Gellert, a generation after Goethe's departure from Leipzig, and after his *Heidenröslein*, *Mailied*, and *Der König in Thule*. Yet in this very letter Kleist again makes *Gefühl* the standard of his judgments: "Altogether, it seems to me that all ceremonies suffocate sentiment. They occupy our reasoning powers [*Verstand*], but the heart remains dead."

The letter dated September 13, 1800, records a great acceleration in his progress. He is more enthusiastic and hopeful than ever before and again mysterious: "Girl, how happy you will be! And I! How you will weep on my neck, hot, devoted [*innige*] tears of joy! How you will thank me with all your soul! But quiet! Nothing is yet quite decided; but the die is cast, and if I see truly—the cast is a winning one" (*so stehen die Augen gut*).

There is nothing to indicate that this mysterious reference is to any definite practical aim or mission. As the following letters show,
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he is pursuing the training of his inner powers with increasing intensity and aspiration. It is inevitable that a mind of his eagerness and creative imagination should frequently see, opening before him, sudden and immense inner prospects, that he should come under sudden spells of vague and somewhat mysterious, but none the less potent and genuine, inspirations. And with his intense disposition, both dramatic and nervously excitable, it would be natural that any sudden vision of great possibilities in store for him should seek utterance in demonstrative language. His mysterious allusions to great prospects need not even be interpreted as intentional mystifications. It is of the nature of such inspirations, such sudden visions, *Gesichtsblicke*—to anticipate a term used by Kleist in his chief characterization of his inseparable companion, Brockes—that great potency and even definiteness of direction is quite compatible with vague and even mysterious remoteness of concrete object.

On September 15 he writes with greater thoroughness of the aims he has set himself in his self-training. He is evidently devoting himself to the study of philosophy. He distinguishes three principal tendencies in philosophy in accordance with their definitions of the "purpose of our entire eternal existence." "Whether," he says, in his amazingly patronizing manner, "the enjoyment of happiness" (*Genuss der Glückseligkeit*), as Epicurus thought, or "the attainment(!) of perfection," as Leibnitz thought, or "the fulfillment of dry duty," as Kant assures us, is the final end of man, that is a barren inquiry even for men and often ruinous.

This curt rejection of any teleological standards of judgments is of interest in showing the instinctive rebellion of his subjective nature against any external standards threatening its spontaneity. At the end of this letter he makes a practical application of his position by advising Wilhelmine not to "trouble [herself] about [her] destination after death, because [she] might thereby easily come to neglect her destination on earth."

On September 18, 1800, he continues at length his discussion of the destination of man. "We will," he says to Wilhelmine, "develop all our faculties just for the purpose of fulfilling this destiny." He is still with Brockes, who "is constantly at strife with nature, because, as he says, he cannot find out from it his eternal destination, and

therefore does nothing for his earthly destination, either." Farther on he characterizes Würzburg as a city in which one forgets activity entirely for devotion. He adds a long essay on the destination of man, in which he repeats verbatim the passage concerning Epicurus, Leibnitz, and Kant. It is obvious that he is keeping a careful record of his daily reflections in his diary. The important new step in this letter is the demand for the development of all our faculties. This is the familiar Romantic insistence on the harmonious unity of all the faculties of man.

This step accounts for the enthusiasm and hopefulness of the letter of September 13, 1800. The literature of that time, from Herder to Kleist and beyond, is full of the extraordinary imaginative and emotional force of the conception of the unity which embraces all the universe, all the substance of life, temporal and eternal, all powers and motions of the human mind in one flaming vision. Those that have this faculty of unified vision, this *Gesichtsblick*, as Brockes called it, according to Kleist, are indeed the children of light in that generation.¹ Kleist, the very gifted and imaginative youth, coming for the first time under the spell of that vision of unity, which for every imaginative young person brings about a crisis and an epoch, must have felt that he had found the key to the mystery of the conduct of life. Everything he had known until that time must have lain before him in the rosy light of a fresh and original knowledge. He must have felt that he was destined to lead humanity to a new goal. He was to be no mere office drudge, nor a mere *Vielwisser*; he was to be a new prophet of mankind. This conclusion is borne out by the letter of October 10, in which he compares his "soul" to the "desk of a philosopher who has thought out a new system and written down his fundamental ideas on scattered sheets" ("der ein neues System ersann und einzelne Hauptgedanken auf zerstreute Papiere niederschrieb").

The immediate effect of this preoccupation with the vision of totality is a decided further shifting of his mental activities toward the imaginative and emotional side. For that vision itself is predominantly imaginative and emotional. And so we find in the next

¹ This subject will be discussed in detail in the fourth paper of this series. In the meantime I refer to the "zusammenbrennende, zusammentreffende Ganze" of Wilhelm Meister's *Lehrjahre*, Book I, chap. xiv.

letter, dated September 19, for the first time a highly emotionalized account of nature. Kleist, however, does not yet go the full length of the totalists, often called pantheists, who use nature symbolically as an expression of their emotions. He leaves only very gradually the conventional objective moorings. He still separates external nature and his states of mind, but he does change the focus of his attention by constantly increasing and intensifying the range of the sensations. His descriptions of nature are now subordinated to descriptions of his emotions, of which nature is regarded as the mere external cause. He concludes a picture of a sunrise with these words, "Yes, now my heart rose [*erhob sich*] under [*unter*] my bosom, for now I saw, and heard, and felt, and perceived [*und fühlte und empfand*] with all my senses that I had a paradise before me." Again, when he walks alone in the dusk, "in the face of the breath of the west-wind," and especially when he then closes his eyes, he hears "whole concerts, complete with all the instruments, from the tender flute to the roaring double bass." He is so interested in his emotions that he begins to devise original experiments in sense-perception. The obvious prevalence of personification in the diction of the last quoted passages is a consistent formal accompaniment of his change of view. Further, he tells of once having heard an adagio, "when I was walking 'against' both the Rhine and the evening wind, so that the waves of the air and of the water at the same time sounded around me" ("*und so die Wellen der Luft und des Wassers zugleich mich umtönten*"). The effect upon him was that of a whole orchestra, and he was so transported that he believed "that all that the wise men of Greece composed [*dichteten*] about the harmony of the spheres, could have been no more soft, more beautiful, more heavenly than this strange dreaming." He can reproduce this concert at will in his mind—"but as soon as an idea regarding it [*ein Gedanke daran*] stirs, at once all is gone—melody, harmony, sound, in short, the whole music of the spheres." The strong and clear partisanship against a discursive thought as the destroyer of his imaginative paradise is an interesting example, to be followed by many more, of his extraordinary alertness in realizing the significance of a new phase in his mental life.

In his studies and reflections recorded in the remaining letters from Würzburg, the destination of man is his chief preoccupation.

The general emotional trend of his development is clearly indicated by the prominence now given to happiness and love as the chief ends of man rather than to perfection and virtue. On September 20 and October 10 he speaks of happiness as the chief good of life, to be attained by "love and culture." He is seriously convinced that he has discovered a new philosophy. It is significant of his new attitude that in the passage from the letter dated October 10, quoted above, he makes the receptacle of his fundamental ideas not his mind but his "soul." After much grandiloquence Wilhelmine's destination is, with a sudden descent to bathos, defined as that of a mother ("so that she may devote herself to the making of noble human beings"), and his own as that of a citizen (*Staatsbürger*), with the ultimate common aim of "das Glück der Liebe."

He has come to a pause. The first glory of his vision of a new philosophy has considerably faded. The enthusiasm of the last letter sounds somewhat hollow and the conclusion is trite. Würzburg, as it appears from the letter of September 20, has nothing more to offer, so that Kleist, who is rooming with Brockes, has to fall back on his old scientific books which he had brought from Frankfurt. In his last letter from Würzburg, October 11, he even reverts to moral allegories drawn from nature after the manner of the conventional utilitarian philosophy of his time.

He leaves Würzburg for a new field of inspiration. After a silence of over a month there comes a letter from Berlin, November 13, 1800. He has reached a decision. He draws inevitable conclusions. "I will take no office," he announces. As an official "I am expected to do what the state demands of me, and yet I am not supposed to examine whether what it demands of me, is good. . . . I have an end of my own before my eyes. . . . I must assert the demands of my higher reason [*Vernunft*] against the will of my superiors." He "lacks the qualities required in an official," "order, precision, patience, unremitting application" (*Unverdrossenheit*). "I work with pleasure only for my own development, and there I am invincibly patient and painstaking." He couples love now generally with development. The chief end of man is happiness. "Love and self-culture [*Bildung*] are two indispensable conditions of my future happiness." But he has to face the practical question of earning a

livelihood. "I assume that I have capabilities, rare capabilities. I believe that no science is too difficult for me, because I advance rapidly, because I have even added new discoveries to some of them . . . thus a literary career would be open to me in the future. . . . I might go to Paris to transplant the latest philosophy to that curious nation."

It is clear that he has in mind no definite object. He cannot refer in the "*neueste Philosophie*" to the Kantian system, as is evident from the letters immediately following. No one who had any knowledge of Kant could have assumed, as he does, that his experiments and reflections as recorded in the following letters could be regarded as pursuits of science, or that his discoveries, which he has recorded in his previous letters, could, as he assumes in this, be claimed as additions to science. From the fulness of his record and the unbroken sequence of his account we are justified in inferring that he withheld no "discovery" which he regarded as important from his correspondence. He must then have reference to what he calls, October 10, his own system of philosophy, which consists in a moralizing contemplation of the inner unity of his faculties, the full cultivation of which he regards as the supreme end of man. Amid the vagueness of all these reflections there stands out clearly a steadily increasing absorption in his imaginative and emotional states of mind, the development of a subjective philosophy of the "soul."

He proposes that Wilhelmine should marry him soon in order that he may have her with him and because he wishes to avoid temptation. There are frequent indications of intense though never gross sensuality in his nature. But he is determined to remain virtuous. "However, one must make it as easy for oneself to remain virtuous as possible" ("*musz sich die Tugend so leicht wie möglich machen*"). The inference from this is that his conception of virtue is being imbued with subjectivity; that it is becoming secondary to subjective impulses. He advises her to keep a diary, also, and record in it daily all that she has seen, thought, and felt. "In this unquiet life," he continues, "we so rarely become conscious of ourselves—our ideas and sentiments die away [*verhalten*] like the tone of a flute in a tempest; so many an experience is lost unused."

He now sets out to study in a more detailed manner his daily thoughts and sentiments. The steady progression toward an ever-increasing absorption in his inner states becomes with each letter more marked. During this phase his letters become again very long and elaborate and follow in rapid succession until he comes to another pause just before the climax. The next letter, of November 16, begins with some conventional anecdotes from the history of natural science. He tells of the falling of an apple, which is supposed to have suggested to Newton the law of gravity; the swinging of a candelabrum in a church, which is supposed to have led Galileo to the discovery of the law of the pendulum, and so forth. He infers from these that "*nothing* [his own underlining] in nature is unimportant and indifferent, and *every* phenomenon worthy of the attention of a thinking being." So far his statements are commonplace enough. But he draws a conclusion which marks a further step in subjectivity. In accordance with the teaching of Rousseau, whose name occurs with increasing frequency during this period, he now rejects books as "bad teachers of moral conduct." "Though they tell us what is true, also perhaps, what is good; yet their teachings do not enter our souls." Only "nature" has access to our souls; it is the best teacher. "Nature," however, means to him, as is shown more and more clearly in the remainder of this letter and in the following, the whole of immediate, subjective sense-perception and association, whereas books are the voice of the "world" and the record of the sum of objective experience. He thus takes the first definite step leading to a rejection of objective standards of knowledge and conduct.

In the remainder of this letter he gives a still more subjective turn to his naturalistic inferences. He tells how in passing through the arched gateway of the city he realized with a start that the arch could not collapse "because all the stones tended to fall at the same time." From this he concludes by a significant analogy that "I, too, should maintain myself if everyone should drop me" ("auch ich mich halten würde, wenn alles mich sinken lässt"). "That," he continues, "no book could have taught me; and that I call truly being taught by nature." A similar consolation, he adds, came to him from a phenomenon of nature on his journey from Würzburg.

"I was standing with my back toward the sun, looking at a vivid rainbow. Thus, I thought, some ray of light always falls into our life; and even when we turn our backs on the sun and look toward the gloomy storm-cloud, we find compensation in the beautiful image which the sun offers us." The importance of this account for our understanding of his development is enhanced by the very absurdity of his assumption that he is approaching the secret of objective knowledge at the very time that his sensational and emotional subjectivity is breaking through the last objective restraints.

On the following day, November 18, he continues his instructions. After cautioning Wilhelmine that she must not merely "perceive all phenomena of nature, but also strive to learn from them," he offers a great many subjective analogies drawn from nature. His attention is centered on inner states. But a few analogies become intensified until they are metaphors and similes. He calls a fan with which a girl plays to hide her embarrassment, in the presence of her lover, "a telegraph of love," and asks Wilhelmine to explain the term. Or "a storm uproots the tree but not the violet, the softest evening breeze sways the violet but not the tree. Wherewith has that an excellent similarity?" and so forth. He no longer relies on facts and events recorded by others but only on his own authentic observations.

On November 29, after disposing of some analogies proposed by the docile Wilhelmine, he moves a step farther from his objectivity. The last traces of ethical import disappear now from his inferences. In their places there appear no longer analogies in terms of conduct, i.e., in relation to his moral environment, but solely in terms of immediate sensational import. It is interesting to observe that while previously he offered the external facts before the corresponding analogies, now he states first certain sense-emotions, which he then proceeds to exemplify by corresponding external objects and occurrences: "What is lovely?—A day in May, a peach blossom, a glad bride, etc. What is uplifting [*erhebend*]? A sunrise, a choral in the morning," and so forth. His list of emotional categories includes: "fearful," "affecting," "terrible," "depressing," "adorable," "consoling," "ridiculous" (trying in the moonlight to jump over the shadow of a lantern-post, which one has mistaken for a ditch),

"intolerable," "arousing expectations," "seductive," "deterrent," "arousing confidence," "majestic" (a sunrise on the sea, a British flagship under full sail, a waterfall, and distant mountains).

It is evident that he has reached the extreme limit in this field of exploration. The phase of his development which began with his arrival in Berlin has culminated, and so now, as before in Würzburg shortly before his departure, a pause occurs in his correspondence. His next letter is dated January, 11, 1801. He mentions a letter written two days earlier, in which he has expressed great dissatisfaction with himself. He feels the arrest of his development. He adds a few questions, which really are pure similes in redundant form, with substantially no new bearings: "If a flame flares up higher and higher by creating its own draft, in how far is it to be compared to the passion of love?" "If the stormwind extinguishes little flames but makes great ones still greater, how can that be compared with misfortune?" "If you see the fog which veils other objects but not that which surrounds yourself, how can you compare that?" (I translate literally.) The only difference between these and the questions of the previous letter is that these embody their answers.

A new epoch in his life is approaching. On January 23, after two communications, dated January 21 and 22, he gives an account of his latest actions. Brockes has left him to take an office. Kleist has been introduced to the Berlin "world of learning," which he finds tiresome. It is interesting to note that very soon after the beginning of his intimacy with Brockes, in Würzburg, September 20, 1800, we learn that the friends spend their time mostly together in the privacy of their rooms. Kleist has continued this withdrawn life until Brockes' departure. Constant association with Brockes evidently has satisfied him; and it is not until the loss of it that he turns again to the outside world.

It is interesting and characteristic that Kleist should at this new departure in his life pause and sum up with his usual clarity of perception the chief elements in the contribution made by Brockes to his development. Only it is necessary to avoid a solely objective understanding of Kleist's characterization of his friend. The characterization is above all a characterization of Kleist's own present dominant

ideas, whether it be a correct description of Brockes or not. We have already seen, and shall see still more clearly, that Kleist, being extremely subjective-individualistic, does not grasp the import of any idea until he has attained an inner state of development which would spontaneously produce essentially that idea. His mind, as is usual with minds of great subjective spontaneity, seems to register only authentic experiences. In this letter he declares that Brockes is the only one that understood him. Brockes has a "free spirit." "A deep feeling for justice" manifested itself in him forcefully and yet gently. He is occasionally brusque, but only toward men of learning, whom he usually called "smatterers" (*Vielwisser*). His principle is, "Action is better than knowledge." He is contemptuous of "science" in the sense of *Vielwisser*, but he is familiar with the foundations of most sciences. His principal aim is to bring everything within him "into unity" (*in Einheit*). He has attained a high degree of self-culture (*Bildung*). He makes a sharp distinction between *Verstand* ("understanding") and the "heart." The former he calls "cold"; only the heart is "active and creative" (*wirkend und schaffend*). He has an insuperable distrust of the former and complete faith in the latter. "He always surrendered entirely to his first spontaneous impulse; that he called his focus of vision (*Gesichtsblick*); and as far as I am concerned I have never found that he was deceived by that impulse. "Immer seiner ersten Regung gab er sich ganz hin, das nannte er seinen Gesichtsblick, und ich selbst habe nie gefunden, dass dieser ihn getäuscht habe."¹ His chief virtue is his disinterestedness (*Uneigennützigkeit*). Farther on Kleist gives a beautiful picture of him as a true and almost overgenerous friend, who sacrifices money, comfort, and pleasure to his young companion. We thus learn, in passing, that Brockes provided funds and leisure for Kleist's efforts of self-training.

In the passage concerning obedience to the first spontaneous impulse and the spontaneous "focus," Kleist has summed up his own development as we have followed it in his letters to this point. This absolute spontaneity, which supersedes conscious reflection and judgment, is one of the chief terms of Romantic subjectivity.

¹ The German terms *Regung* (literally "stir") and *Gesichtsblick* have more direct implications of original activity than the English terms available for translation.

It strips conduct of objective standards and turns it into a purely emotional function.

Kleist now enters upon the crucial stage of his development. The devastating consequences of his final abandonment of objective standards proceed to appear as the motives of his further conduct with the same consistency which characterizes his course up to this point. This phase covers two months of brooding, hidden in silence but for one illuminating letter to his sister Ulrike, dated February 5.¹ He is unhappy in Berlin because no one understands him. He is chiefly concerned with his "innermost being" (*Innerstes*). This he can communicate to no one, not even to his sister. Language is inadequate to the task. It cannot "picture the soul" (*die Seele nicht malen*), but conveys only disconnected fragments. He is seized with horror whenever he tries to open his "innermost being" to anyone, not because that being is afraid of its nakedness, but because it cannot be revealed in its "totality" and so must be misunderstood. He cannot take office because he is accustomed now to follow his own ends. He knows that he cannot live with people ("ich passe nicht unter die Menschen"). "Even the pillar, to which I used to cling in the whirlpool of life, is shaken . . . I mean, my love of the sciences. . . . Knowledge cannot possibly be the highest end; action is better than knowledge." After some further reflections in a similar strain, there occurs the startling hint that rather than *seek* any highest end we must do that "wozu uns die Natur treibt." For the first time now he interprets spontaneity no longer as an active, but, like extreme Romanticism, as a passive force.

His self-absorption in the holy of holies of his inmost being, his increasing isolation, his insistence on the indissoluble and incommunicable inner totality, his final contempt for knowledge; and lastly, after his praise of action, his passive, Romantic surrender to every impulse of nature, draws the inevitable conclusion of the preceding course of his inner life. Unless a decided objective diversion is forced upon him he is on the brink of a catastrophe. Without a vivifying external influence the very subjectivity, whose authority

¹ *H. von Kleist's Briefe an seine Schwester Ulrike*. Hrg. von Dr. A. Koberstein (Berlin, 1860); *H. von Kleist, Briefe an seine Schwester Ulrike*. Hrg. von S. Rahmer (Berlin, 1905).

he has constantly increased until it has become almost exclusive, must now proceed, with an iron logic, to destroy its ward, the inner being.

The catastrophe takes place a month and a half later. He gives a full account of it on March 22, 1801, in a long letter, the chief passages of which are verbatim repeated in a letter of the same date to his sister Ulrike. His "whole being revolves around one principal idea" which has seized his "innermost soul" (*Innerstes*) and has produced in him a deep and shattering effect (*tiefe erschütternde Wirkung*). This has happened during the "last three weeks" and he does not know how he can compress all the agitation that has shaken his soul during that time into the space of a letter.

From childhood he has held to the belief (*mir den Gedanken angeeignet*) that "perfection is the aim of creation" (*Vervollkommenung der Zweck der Schöpfung*), and this belief had become almost a religious faith. "Self-culture [*Bildung*]" seemed to me the only aim worthy of endeavor, *Truth*, the only treasure worthy of possession." But recently (evidently in the last three weeks, referred to in the beginning of the letter) he has become acquainted with the "so-called" Kantian philosophy, and he must tell her one idea of that philosophy which, on account of her ignorance, cannot "shake her so deeply, so painfully, as himself." Then follows the principal passage:

If all men instead of their eyes had green glasses [*sic!*] they would of necessity judge that the objects which they saw, were green—and never would they be able to decide whether their eyes showed them the things as they are, or whether they added to all objects something, which does not pertain to the latter but to the eyes. Thus it is with the *Verstand*. We cannot decide whether that which we call truth, really is truth, or only appears so. If the latter, then the truth which we collect here on earth, has no existence after death—and all endeavor to acquire any possession which would follow us into the grave, is vain . . .

Ah! Wilhelmine, if the point of this idea does not pierce your heart, at any rate, do not laugh at another who is deeply wounded in his innermost, most sacred, being. My sole, my highest aim, has fallen and I have no longer any.

Since that time he has not "touched a book." He has paced the floor, sat inactive at the window, rushed out into the open, idled in

restaurants and cafés, sought diversion, even "made a fool of himself" (without specifications), "an unspeakable emptiness filled [*sic!*] my innermost being." He again, as in his previous crises, determines upon a change of scene.

In spite of its conceit and naïve dramatizations the letter is obviously sincere. It gives an entirely consistent picture of his state of mind in all its most important aspects. But his own account of the true *causes* of that state of mind is on its own evidence certainly wrong. The change in him, according to his statement, has been brought about within the last three weeks, and is the result of a logical argument, i.e., of his discovery of Kant's proof of the subjectivity of sense-perception. Now, Kleist had studied Kant even in Frankfurt a. O. He had, as a student in Würzburg, Leipzig, and Berlin, continued his studies in philosophy. It is inconceivable that a mind so alert as his should have been in ignorance of the doctrine on which the entire Kantian system rests and which by 1801 must have been on the lips of any academic group. The true logic of this epoch in his life cannot be found in the abstract reasons which he himself assigns to it, but in the motives which have given direction to his development to this point.

Kleist is also mistaken, as the record of his letters from the early days in Würzburg shows, in assuming that perfection has been his supreme end. He expressly rejects it as the only end, and later makes happiness through love and self-culture (*Bildung*) his chief end. He is even more mistaken in assuming that *Truth*, in the *objective* sense, has been his chief object. The entire course of his development, beginning with Würzburg and even earlier, has been an unceasing though very gradual shifting from objective to subjective truth or self-realization. In the detailed account of his letter, dated February 5, 1801, in which there is no mention of Kant, nor even a hint of Kantian studies, are contained all the elements of that development, in a consummation of subjective isolation, to which the Kantian doctrine could not have added anything material. No substantial change in his mind was required to produce the change recorded in the letter of March 22. The change was already complete; the epoch fully ripe. The Kantian doctrine merely furnished him a formula for the appraisal of his state of mind.

From now on his course becomes more simple, because he is less confused than formerly by wishes to set himself deliberate aims. The decision no longer actively to *seek* a course but to *follow* the requirements "of his nature," reached at the end of his letter to Ulrike of February 5, becomes more and more exclusively the motive of his development, which proceeds at a rapidly growing pace.

On March 28, hardly a week after his critical letter, he again writes Wilhelmine. He is quite unsettled. He now sneers at "the dry language of philosophy." He has, he says, fallen into confusion through himself (*durch mich selbst*) and must find his way out of it through himself. He would be "eternally unhappy" if he had to remain forever in this perplexing condition, "with a violent inner impulse towards activity, and yet without an aim." But dreaming in his room will not help him. He must go out "into the open." Berlin has nothing to offer him. In "nature" and among strangers he hopes to recover himself. His coupling of nature with strangers implies a desire, not for association with others, but for greater isolation.

On April 9, after another long pause, still from Berlin, he bids farewell to Wilhelmine, "as if forever" ("mir ist es, als wäre es auf ewig"). He feels like a child that has strayed out upon the ocean and sees no refuge. The "first cause" of his journey, he continues, is really "nothing except an inner disgust with all scientific work." His whole idea is therefore nothing but a great "walk outdoors" (*ein grosser Spaziergang*). He intends to go to Paris to study mathematics and natural science. But his heart is not in such work. "Ah! Wilhelmine, I, a student! in *this* frame of mind!" He will try, however, merely to oblige his friends. "All that people expect of my understanding [*Verstand*]-how can I accomplish it?" How can he study since his real purpose is to flee from all knowledge (*Wissen*)? He has addresses of French men of science, and so "I shall come again into that circle of cold, one-sided people in whose company I was never at home."

On April 24, still from Berlin, he writes in a different, quiet tone. He now recognizes that a period in his life has come to a close and draws his own calm conclusion. After asking Wilhelmine to read over his letters since the beginning of his crisis, he sums up: "This

period in my life, in which circumstances forcibly drew me on to an action, with which one would have permitted himself only to play,¹ seems to me extremely remarkable" ("Mir ist diese Periode in meinem Leben und dieses gewaltsame Fortziehen der Verhältnisse zu einer Handlung, mit der man sich bloss zu spielen erlaubt hätte, äusserst merkwürdig").

His cry now is for "freedom" (*Freiheit*). Neither honor, nor riches, nor sciences can alone satisfy him now. He is determined to forget "the whole wretched sophistication" (*Spitzfindigkeit*, evidently referring to his former attempts of adapting himself to the objective order of society), which is the cause of his "inner confusion."

For the first time we encounter here the *innere Verwirrung*, which throughout his greater dramas, where it appears as *Gefühlungsverwirrung*, is his principal tragic motive of character. This confusion ensues whenever a character permits any deliberate purposes or intellectual conclusions to interfere with his spontaneous impulses. The spontaneous impulses alone, according to this view, produce integrity and unity of action and clarity of states of mind. The intellectual activities of the *Verstand* are both inferior and disturbing. He has almost reached the extreme Romantic totalistic unity of impulse.

On May 4 he writes from Dresden. A nature description, in which he compares nature to a fifteen-year-old girl, has a distinctly poetic flavor. Ulrike has been with him trying to divert him, but without more than temporary success. Ulrike's nature—gay, normal, enterprising—is, as he says, contrary to his present needs.

On May 21 he writes from Leipzig that he has neglected even keeping his diary, because he is "disgusted with writing." He praises Dresden. "Nothing was so fitted to lead one entirely away from the dreary field of science, without leaving a trace of any old memories, as the works of art collected in Dresden."

On his first visit to Dresden, about a year earlier, he has no interest in art, but leaves the museums to seek "nature." Now he regards art as the most important subject of interest, because "in the enjoyment of art one has no need of the understanding." "Art affects only sense and heart" (*Sinn und Herz*). For the first time he has

¹ This must refer to his plan to go to Paris.

entered into this "new world full of beauty." More, however, than even by pictorial art, he is moved by the music in the Catholic churches. "Ah! Wilhelmine," he continues, "our divine services are none at all. They speak only to the cold understanding; but a Catholic festival speaks to all our senses."¹ We need only to compare this estimate with that pronounced, but six months earlier, upon his arrival in Würzburg, September 11, to note another radical change. He has now discovered another field besides "nature" in the realm of the inner life, namely, all the arts. But here, too, as the phraseology of this letter and his subsequent development show, he limits the inner life to the sensations. This new step, therefore, marks not a departure toward a greater interest in objective reality, but a further progress in his concentration on the sensational motives of conduct.

To complete the sphere of sensationalism as the sole basis of conduct, only one more step is required: the limitation of the affections to their sensational elements. This also occurs in this letter, in the identification of "sense" with "heart." After a passage in which advice on practical matters is spurned, he adds: "When the heart feels a want, it is cold toward everything that fails to satisfy it." He has burned all his letters of recommendation. "For nothing is more dangerous to a heart which responds to every impression than acquaintance." With this step his isolation within his inner life is almost complete. The only active relief from this sealed inwardness, possible for him who had the gift of language to an extraordinary degree, was literary creation of an extremely Romantic character. We find him from now on rapidly tending in that direction.

He is, however, not yet fully conscious of the inevitable conclusion. But his letters betray with increasing clearness the poetic animus. In the letter from which the last quotations have been taken there occurs a fine passage. After telling of the emergence of the Elbe River from the *Erzgebirge*, he says: "As a maid appears among men, thus slim and clear she steps out among the rocks! Softly, with modest tremors [*Wanken*], she comes near. The noble

¹ This one-sided interest in the sensuous part of Catholic services, and the total disregard of the Catholic doctrine of an absolute authority, which is at the opposite pole from Romanticism, is characteristic of many Romanticists.

sex press forward, barring her way, to look upon the face of the pure and glowing one—but she, without tarrying, with a quick blush, passes through them on her winding way.”

On June 3, 1801, in Göttingen, the state of idle sensationalism continues, approaching almost the point of emotional fatalism: “When thoughts strive with thoughts, emotions with emotions, then it is difficult to name the power which is ruling the soul, because the victory is still undecided.” He is tired of mere “thinking”; “work” alone can give him peace. But he offers no hint of the nature of the work. He regrets Ulrike’s presence, though he cares for her. She prevents his concentration upon himself. He finds writing letters very difficult.

On July 21, 1801, he is in Paris. He writes that he has not yet an aim and does not know in which direction he is moving. He is trying once more to study, but: “Ah! Wilhelmine, these people talk to me of alkalis and acids, whilst an overpowering necessity is parching my lips.” On August 15, 1801, again writing from Paris, he is a little more hopeful. He is again upon the verge of a decision: “My senses tell me,” he writes, “what my feelings [*Gefühl*] told me, long ago, that the sciences make us neither better nor happier, and I hope that this [intimation] will lead me to a resolution.” Finding in Paris a combination of the “highest immorality” with the “highest science,” he concludes that science and “culture” [*Bildung*] have nothing in common. He sees the books of Rousseau, Helvetius, Voltaire, and works on natural history in all the libraries, but they seem to have done no good. If at least half of the energy spent in writing had been given to acting, conditions would have been better.

Rousseau, his former hero, is now suddenly banished among the rationalists and the men of objective science. He, too, has become too objective for Kleist. It seems that in this identification of “writing” and “science,” which marks a new step, he has not merely lost all interest in science, but has forgotten the last trace of the specific meaning of science. “Writing,” constantly used in antithesis to “action,” appears in the subsequent passages as synonymous with recorded experience of others. Being thus a form of mediated or objective experience, it is spurned as an intrusion into the

immediate sensationalism¹ which he now identifies with the essence of the personal life. "Action," as his antithesis of "writing," has not the ordinary, objective meaning of the term. There is no hint that even since the early days of his perfunctory pursuit of office Kleist ever projected any practical action; and there are numerous indications of the opposite in his letters written after this time. "Action," from now on in these letters, is generally associated with "freedom" and synonymous with it. It means the absolute subjective freedom of spontaneous impulse within a universe of sensations. He has reached the extreme Romantic freedom, including the totalistic conception of impulse and the negative interpretation of spontaneity. He now draws the inevitable conclusions regarding the ethical standards of conduct.

Kleist first becomes aware of the ethical implications of his course in his letter of January 23² as he comes to a pause on the brink of his crisis; and again in the letter of March 22, announcing the catastrophe. Beginning with the present letter we find him passing step by step through all the stages of Romantic ethics, until in this field also every trace of objective standards is removed and subjective impulses are left in complete control. His argument, in this letter, is as follows:

Without science men are barbarians, superstitious, cowardly, helpless; and with it they become luxurious, self-indulgent, and degenerate. Both, science and ignorance, lead to virtues and vices. And so whatever we do, we may do right. There can be no absolute responsibility; there cannot be anything absolutely bad. What is moral in one is evil in another. The only right thing to do, then, is to live out one's life in accordance with one's nature.

"Freedom, a home, a wife" he now desires above all. It is the duty of heaven to give us "enjoyment of life" (*Lebensgenuss*); it is our duty to deserve it.

His account of the reasons which led him to this conclusion, though undoubtedly sincere, is too obviously absurd to require refutation. The ethical dilemma which he constructs is not limited to science. As in the explanation of his great crisis in Berlin he attributes to logical reason the results of his inner impulses. The true moving cause of his ethical conclusion comes to light in the closing

¹ I prefer the term "sensationalism" to "emotionalism" to emphasize the extreme degree of his subjectivity. Only the emotions aroused by the immediate sense-contact with objects concern him. Emotions aroused through the mediation of the minds of others are spurned by him.

² P. 121, above.

part of the same letter, which begins with the statement that he is not yet ready for a resolution. He continues that he must see and feel more clearly until "reason and heart with all the power of his soul produce a final decision" ("bis Vernunft und Herz mit aller Gewalt meiner Seele einen Entschluss fassen"). He is passively waiting for the miracle of spontaneity and interpreting the "soul" as the mysterious force of which "reason" and "heart" are the functions.

A long pause occurs. After nearly two months, on October 10, he writes again. He has one great desire: "To do something good." His heart is "panting for deeds" (*tatenlehzend*). He longs for a great "sphere of activity." But he warns Wilhelmine not to judge his sphere by the standards of the "world." He has for a number of years (his development has covered such a long course that it naturally must to him have seemed to have covered a long stretch of time) "become very different from what people call 'the world.'" He cannot fit himself to any "conventional relations of the world." He cannot accept the estimates placed by the world on institutions or men. A man who is useful to one people may be destructive to ten others. He wishes to do only that which is "good in accordance with his necessities." With this conversion of his impulses into necessities, of "I desire" into "I must," he has practically reached ethical nihilism.

He is afraid that by his aversion to office and science he will disappoint those in whom he has aroused great expectations. But why should he be "influenced by the expectations of others"?

Not until now is there definite evidence that Kleist is seriously considering the career of a poet. Continuing in the same letter he writes that he cannot live in Germany without an office, for lack of funds. He thinks that he might earn his living by writing. But "writing books for money" is to him "unthinkable." Then follows the important confession: "Finding so little for my needs among the people of this city, I have, in a solitary hour, worked out an ideal for myself; but I do not comprehend how a poet can surrender the song of his love to such a rude mob as men are. A bastard, they call it. I would gladly lead you into the vault where I solemnly keep my child, as a Vestal Virgin hers, under the light of my lamp."

The reference is generally interpreted as being to his *Robert Guiscard*. He has obviously not begun definite composition. The

subject can hardly have passed beyond the earliest stages of inspiration and vague project. The most definite characteristic both of the project and of his state of mind is his extreme, hypersensitive isolation from objective contacts and standards.

At the conclusion of the letter he proposes to buy a little farm in Switzerland and live as a farmer. He explains his desire thus: "Only in the world it is painful to be little, not outside of it."

In his next letter from Paris, October 27, he is enthusiastic over his plan to live in the country, and have "freedom, the noblest kind of work, a property, a wife." The "work" is probably, as will appear in the concluding part of this paper, *Robert Guiscard*.

Wilhelmine refused to join him in this harebrained project, which Ulrike also had condemned. After his return to Germany, on December 2, he writes her from Frankfurt a. M., pleading with her to reconsider her refusal.

This practically ends their relations. He is silent for a long period. On May 20, 1802, he writes her for the last time. He is now living on an island in the river Aar near Thun in Switzerland, carrying out his fantastic scheme with the assistance of a native girl whom he calls Mädeli. Wilhelmine in the meantime has lost, through sudden death, her favorite brother Karl, Kleist's friend. She is very unhappy and ill and very much in need of his sympathy and consolation. His last letter, written in reply to her repeated messages, contains not a word of sympathy or regret. It is shockingly heartless. He tells her finally that he has now an ambition to be a famous man and that he shall not return to Germany until he has achieved his purpose. He sums up with the dictum: "That is decided, as is the nature of my soul."

His most immediate and imperious desires are now the sole law of his being. He has reached the final conclusion of his development. He is no longer interested in Wilhelmine. He is hardly aware of her. The humble, patient vessel into which he has poured the drama of his mind ceases to be of use to him the moment the last line is spoken and is promptly, almost absent-mindedly, dropped, as the now complete, extreme Romanticist passes on his way.

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[To be concluded]

WILHELM RAABE'S TRILOGY, *DER HUNGERPASTOR*,
ABU TELFAN, *DER SCHÜDDERUMP*

Wherein lies the unity of these three novels? To what extent may they be termed a trilogy? There is no unity of plot, no persistent character, no recurrence of scene or situation and yet Raabe testifies to an inner relation. The last paragraph of his *Schüdderump* reads as follows: "We have come to the close. And it was a long and hard road to travel from the pastorate of the *Hungerpastor* at Grunzenow on the Baltic via Abu Telfan in Tumorkieland under the shadows of the Moon Ridge to the poorhouse at Krodbeck at the base of the old Germanic Zauberberg."

The usual method of procedure in determining such a question would be that of a close analysis of the author's personality and the conditions under which these works were produced, with the end in view of weighing and determining the reflex of the author's personality and experience in the choice of his motifs, the shaping of his plot, the form and growth of his characters, and his distribution of life's destinies. But the difficulties of such a course are at once apparent, when one considers the taciturn nature of the man. His sole means of communication with the outer world, and for him no doubt the only adequate and satisfactory means, lay in his works. And in the brief period of his lifetime (1831-1910) the German nation grew richer by some thirty-eight volumes of stories and novels written by him. Yet although we have so little supplementary information from autobiographical material, a study of the trilogy in the light of Raabe's contemporaries will, I think, be found very illuminating.

In a certain sense, Storm's development is perhaps as typical of a certain phase of nineteenth-century thought and craftsmanship as any that could be adduced. His first serious literary effort, *Immensee*, stamps the youthful author a romanticist, who expresses the fullness of his emotional life in a *Stimmungsnovelle*. His last novel, *Der Schimmelreiter*, depicts a totally different type of hero and points to a totally different outlook upon life. Hauke Haien is a man whose

life is a constant struggle against the hostile elements of the North Sea and the inferiority, superstition, meanness, and parsimony of his home community. *Der Schimmelreiter* is a splendid type of the *Konfliktsnovelle*; *Immensee* treats of the fame and fortune of an individual in its individual aspects.

A further phase of nineteenth-century thought we have represented in Hebbel. He grew to manhood amidst want and poverty; his early life presents a scene of constant conflict. What further development does he show beyond Storm? His most mature works embody the more tragic aspects of life. He brings the message that the wholly innocent and guiltless too often suffer from the tyranny of unwarranted social conditions. The tragedy of the misfit in its various forms and aspects, the hardships accruing to the individual in transition periods, when values and standards are undergoing change—these are the subjects that attract him.

Raabe shows a development similar to that of Storm and Hebbel. This is our thesis. In the three novels above mentioned he deals with the question, What is life? In formulating his first answer, he begins with the *Entwicklungsnovelle* like Storm. His outlook upon life broadens and he gives his second answer to the question in the form of a *Konfliktsnovelle*. This too is inadequate to express the fulness of his observations, and he shapes his third answer like Hebbel in a tragedy of unwarranted social conditions.

All these novels, however, have their meaning. The third answer to the question, What is life? does not make the first or second superfluous. All three present equally valuable aspects of the one great problem. To answer it implied the closest observation and the fullest experience. "We have come to the close," says Raabe in the last of the series, "it was a long and hard road to travel."

The first of the series, *Der Hungerpastor*, in which Raabe treats the problem of individuality in its individual aspect, was written in 1863, when the theory of evolution was rapidly gaining ground in German literature, primarily no doubt, through the life-work of Goethe. The opening scene is laid in a German village in the year 1815. It is therefore meant on the whole as a treatment of life and conditions in the present. There are two persistent characters depicted in sharp contrast: the one in his development to ever greater

wisdom and usefulness, the other as he sinks into hopeless degradation. What they have in common is *Hunger*, the desire to grow, that force which, in the opinion of the author, is at the basis of all life. Even a superficial examination of the novel will confirm the opinion that its theme is the individual impulse to grow both in its salutary and in its destructive aspect.

Hans Unwirrsch is the son of a poor shoemaker, who plies his needle and drives his pegs under the gleam of an iridescent globe hanging there before him to catch and concentrate the rays of light from a small lamp in his dingy workshop. His life is one of unceasing toil and of golden dreams never to be realized. When death comes his son falls heir to the shoemaker's globe and to his father's longing for knowledge and understanding.

The first step in this direction is the community school for the poor. The scenes described remind us of Dickens. When the master Silberlöffel breathes his last, it is with this sad plaint, "I have been very hungry, hungry for love and thirsty for knowledge; all else was nought."

Hans enters the *Gymnasium*. His mother cannot understand the boy's striving, his groping from the darkness into the light, but with the instinct of love and the sacred memory of her husband's dreams to prompt her, she slaves at her washtub and adds to the meager store of the paternal inheritance. The shoemaker's globe is the symbol of their lives.

The author stops to philosophize. Man is born with the hunger for eternal things; he feels its prompting in an unselfish longing for something that is yet to come. But when the years of discretion are at hand, its sacred impulse is stifled all too easily in a compromise with the comforts of life and the all-absorbing pursuit of its showy baubles.

Not so with Hans Unwirrsch. Love beckoned him and Love stood at his side. There was the sacred memory of his father to guide him, the daily sacrifice of his mother to spur him onward. To trudge along the hard road of poverty ennobled him, for it pledged him to unselfish duty, and it fortified him to strive on without flinching. So his years at the university hurried on all too quickly and his experiences as a private tutor in the homes of wealth and opulence began. There

was a time when there came to his ear much loud laughter—laughter with no ring of joy in it—and for a nature like Hans Unwirrsch's, whose "why" went out to every contradiction of life, this was a dangerous period. But it left him sad, not bitter. The undefined *Hunger* of his youth eventually became a calm, well-poised, ever-present, purpose of life, such as, active in millions of hearts, leads humanity onward in its course and upward.

So we say farewell to Hans, happily married in a modest parish on the bleak coast of the Baltic, devoting himself to a life of service among poor fisher-folk. This is his prayer as he assumes the duties of his charge:

I have gone the way that thou, Father Unwirrsch, hast directed.

I have erred much; and often my heart has failed me.

It is hard to come from the huts of the lowly; *his* heart must be strong midst good and evil.

He who is born in the depths, shall be the liberator of mankind.

There is nothing greater in man, than his longing for eternal values.

Father Unwirrsch, I have followed my pathway and been sore at heart; I have found the truth; I have learned to choose the genuine and despise the trivial.

I have no fear, for Love stands at my side.

And in his Christmas sermon at Grunzenow, the old retiring pastor Fillenius told of the good tidings that gladdened the hearts of men—how great and splendid was the Roman Empire and yet how desolate and waste this earth; how Christ was born into the hungry world and all mankind raised aloft its arms for the bread of life; how the heavens were opened and there appeared a great light, and men and women knelt and heard the words, "Truth! Freedom! Love!"

Raabe's first answer then to the question, What is life? is an answer in its individual aspect. Life is a striving of the noble soul for eternal values. Like Faust, Hans Unwirrsch is led from obscure aspirations through love, experience, beneficent activity, to a knowledge of the "one true way." Like Faust in his last moments, he devotes his life to the service of love on a bleak and storm-driven coast and builds free and happy homes for the coming generations of men. "Hand on your weapons, Hans Unwirrsch!" is the slogan at the close. It means guidance, control, direction of the inner impulse for self-development and for service.

The contrast figure introduced to bring home this truth is Moses Freudenstein, the son of a down-trodden Jewish peddler and dealer in second-hand goods. Moses is directed to know and to understand, so that he may the more effectually shield himself against oppression and the more surely triumph over his enemies. These are the old Jew's words: "You will grow to be a great man; you need fear no one; and the 'cake' you will have, too. They'll have to give it to you. And I'll help you to get the money." Moses grows in knowledge and in selfishness. His father rejoices, "He will never bend his back in humility." But Moses forgets the love that attaches to the penuriously gained wealth his father is amassing for him and secretly despises the childish old man. What is dark in the boy's soul grows darker and Egoism stretches forth its hundred arms to seize the world. His desires are always gratified—gratified at any cost. His father, his friend, a few trusting women, his own inner approbation, his wife—he sacrifices all for his vain ambitions. In 1852 the convert to Catholicism, Dr. Theophile Stein, the privy counselor and government spy on the movements of suspicious personages in Paris, is feared by many, hated by all, and dead to his fellow-men—dead in the most awful sense of the word.

Though this may be a splendid novel, it is entirely inadequate as an answer to the question, What is life? It is as though at this time Raabe had assumed the viewpoint of the ordinary man of affairs, who has no conception of himself as a historic-phenomenon, as a unit of life that has been molded and welded into shape by the forces of the present and the accumulations of the past. It is as though he were still naïvely classifying all phenomena (witness the character of Moses) into the one category of good and evil without relation to the causes that make for good and evil. To him at this time life seems to have been isolated and quite independent of its environment. Let man strive unselfishly for the benefit of others is his gospel.

But what of the darkness that too often obscures the vision? What of the chains and fetters that impede one's movements and to which the wanderer is all but oblivious? And even with worthy ideals steadfastly pursued, is the rock of purpose impervious to the attack of hostile forces—to the drip, drip, drip of falling water? It

is perhaps with these thoughts in mind that Raabe once referred to his *Hungerpastor* as *eine Jugendsünde*.

The second novel of the series is his *Abu Telfan* in which he takes up these very problems involving the relation of the individual to his environment. The tragic heroine of this tale is Nicola von Einstein. The parallel figure, serving as a magic mirror of her situation and experiences, is Leonhard Tagebucher. These are the two persistent characters. Both are striving like Hans Unwirrsch for higher things. The Moses Freudenstein of this novel is Herr von Glimmern. Nicola figures as the victim of Herr von Glimmern, who in turn comes to an untimely end as a punishment for his rascality.

As already mentioned Leonhard Tagebucher's experiences serve as a companion piece to those of the heroine. At the opening of the story he makes his appearance with a history that leaves the reader in no doubt about his situation. The study of theology had disagreed with him, he had taken sudden leave, and after many adventures with slave-dealers in Egypt, was himself taken captive on the Upper Nile and held the slave and servant of a big fat beauty, Kulla Gulla, in the land of Abu Telfan under the shadows of the Moon Ridge. Now, at the beginning of events, after eleven years of bondage, with his fetters unclasped, he returns home—penniless but free, free to his native town of Nippenburg, to his parents, to his uncle, and to his Aunt Schnödler.

What is Nippenburg? Like Keller's Seldwyla, the home of the Philistine, Abu Telfan with a vengeance. A community of those dull, narrow-minded souls, whose lives are bounded by the conventional, whose mass-instinct relentlessly crushes the helpless unit that dares to depart from the beaten path of tradition, and then applauds its terrible deed of savagery in complacent self-righteousness. This is the home to which Leonhard Tagebucher returns, the Nippenburg of his golden dreams during eleven years of abject slavery. And the author pauses to remark: "As our acquaintance grew with this splendid fellow we have come to the conclusion that his most varied, astounding, dangerous, and mysterious adventures were not experienced in Egypt, Nubia, Abyssinia, and the Kingdom of Darfur, but here, where by long centuries of established usage the name of Germany appears upon the map." Let it suffice

to say that in the relentless conflict, waged for the preservation of his personality and self-respect, Leonhard Tagebucher eventually gains peace of heart and mind and is able to administer to the needs of another more helpless than himself.

This poor unfortunate is Nicola von Einstein, one of his first acquaintances upon his return from slavery. Nicola's father had been a general at a petty German court with never an opportunity to prove his valor. Upon his death the mother and daughter were left destitute and Nicola was educated as befitted her station by the favor of the duchess. She became one of a brilliant court constellation and was betrothed to Victor von Fehlleysen, an officer of her set. A rascally, but carefully masked plot by Herr von Glimmern, the confidant of the prince, destroyed her happiness. Her betrothed left for parts unknown, unable to bear the seeming disgrace of his father's ruin, and Nicola was left to mourn and hope for his return.

She is twenty-seven when she meets Leonhard Tagebucher, the fugitive from Abu Telfan and the slave of Nippenburg. Her misfortunes have cleared her vision. She sees that she, too, is beating her wings helplessly against the bars of her golden cage. What has life to offer her? A dull routine of trivialities from which she cannot escape, a fairy-tale world with but one object of existence: to live up to the standards of her station. To make matters worse, her mother is championing the suit of Herr von Glimmern, who offers her an assured position in society and a varied round of pleasures for her distraction. Thus she maintains the hard struggle to remain true to her better self. But the hopelessness of the future, the constant appeals and admonitions of her mother finally undermine her strength of purpose. She "buries her heart and takes life as it is." She "closes the book of her hopes and her dreams and resigns herself to the inevitable." (A quotation from her letters.)

Nicola succumbs to the drip, drip, drip of falling water and pays the penalty. When the rascality of Herr von Glimmern is revealed to the world, she takes refuge in the solitude of the deserted mill. Silence reigns about her and no wave sweeps to the threshold of her retreat. "If you knew what I know," says Mahomet, "your laughter would cease and your tears would flow." This is the motto upon the title-page.

But Nicola von Einstein lost heart! True, the odds were overwhelmingly against her, but if she had clung to hope like the old woman in the deserted mill she would have suffered no such shipwreck.¹ Raabe's second answer seems to have been: life presents a relentless conflict in the pursuit of eternal values. Life is what the individual makes it in spite of opposition. And compromise spells ruin.

Is this an adequate answer? Not long, for Raabe. What was he to say of many an unfortunate, who had begun life's journey with him in the golden chariot of Hope, as Schiller describes it in his *Ideals*. Did life here fall short of its glorious possibilities because like Nicola they lost heart in the struggle? Though some may have lost heart, is it not equally true that others never wavered? And then the end came and they greeted Death as the great Comforter. This is Raabe's third answer in his *Schüdderump*, the death-cart.

The scenes of this story are laid in the little village of Krodebeck near the Harz Mountains. Dietrich Häuszler, the village barber, had served his apprenticeship in Berlin, that great center of wealth, and left it inspired with an ideal—the ideal of having a beautiful daughter, over whose destiny he might lord it at his pleasure. He was married in 1820. His wife died at Krodebeck in 1839, a deserted woman, one year after the departure of her husband from Krodebeck with his ideal realized and “beautiful Mary,” as she was called, at his side. In 1850 “beautiful Mary” returned to Krodebeck with her little daughter Antonie. This poor mother returned, lying on a litter of straw in a two-wheeled cart, to die in the poorhouse. In 1861, the scion of the Häuszler family, Antonie's grandfather, was likewise destined to return to Krodebeck, at a time when Marie Häuszler's child, Antonie, had grown to beautiful womanhood. And then the title of the novel was to find its fullest exemplification.

There on her deathbed in the poorhouse at Krodebeck, Marie Häuszler felt no remorse for the life she had led, for they had all been against her. Only when she thought of her child, the anguish of her heart convulsed her frame and she sobbed, “They will make her pay for what I have taken.” Jane Warwolf heard it and sighed: “Alas, it has been the way of the world for more than a thousand years.”

¹ Cf. *Abu Telfan*, pp. 197, 214, Janke ed.

Marie Häuszler soon passed away and brighter days followed. There in the poorhouse at Krodebeck, Hanne Altmann found herself repaid in caring for the little waif during one brief year of unalloyed happiness, for all her seventy-five years of suffering and wretchedness. Then she too passed away.

Upon the estate Lauenhof near by lived a rare man, one of those of whom Jane Warwolf could say: "He lost his way and came from another world into ours and now he is searching for the way home and gives heed to nought else at the wayside that attracts men." He was a retired officer from the Wars of Liberation, a poor refugee, who lived at the Lauenhof dependent upon the good wishes of its energetic mistress, quite unaware that he gave far more than he received. But Frau Adelheid knew and came to him often for counsel. Sometimes there were tears in her eyes because of the love and charity in his heart.

He was a strange man, too. A man whose life was filled with many misgivings; who strove without interruption by many queer turns and devious routes to probe the mysteries of existence. Ill satisfied merely to become cognizant of evil and to alleviate misery, his heart went out to the suffering and groped about in anguish for the why and the wherefore. A simple man! Not one of those unhappy fortunates whose life is filled with some great purpose ever beyond realization, but a child with the quaint wisdom of years, the inner need to question and the faith that Christ commended.

When little Tonie Häuszler first caught his attention in that miserable two-wheeled cart going to the poorhouse, this knight of Gläubigern did not turn away like Lady Adelaide Klotilde Paula de St. Tronin. On the contrary, he intervened to send the angry mob of Krodebeck citizens about their business and, after the sufferers had been cared for, he returned to the Lauenhof with little appetite for the evening meal and retired somewhat earlier than was his custom to the seclusion of his rooms.

A year later, when Hanne Altmann had passed away and little Tonie had fled in terror from the poorhouse to his arms, he took her to his heart, watched over her, and reared her like his own child. The seed fell upon rich ground. She became the treasure of his heart. "I had grown to be sixty-eight," he confesses, "ever searching for the

missing something in my life—until she came to tell me and to tell us all. For they all lived in want of what she brought to Krodebeck, though perhaps they strove less for it and suffered less for want of it.”

Now what a beautiful story it would have been, the author reflects, to have pretty Tonie Häuszler, accomplished, the handmaid of all the Graces, duly installed at the Lauenhof as the life-companion of her close friend and playmate, Hennig von Lauen! For there were moments when he thought in all truth that he loved her. But, alas! 1861 was near at hand, when “the serene blue of the etherial skies above was to resound with Olympian laughter.”

Dietrich Häuszler, Tonie’s grandfather, had been all but forgotten these many years. Picture the consternation at the Lauenhof when the report was spread abroad that Dietrich Häuszler, a wealthy dealer in government supplies and incidentally the willing tool of the unscrupulous, was on his way to Krodebeck in a coach-and-four to claim his long-forgotten granddaughter. He came and pressed her to his heart and none could say him nay, when he kissed her lips again and again and fondly vowed that they should never part. It was in 1861 that this beautiful girl of sixteen summers, her heart filled with golden dreams and rosy hopes of youth, mounted the *Schüdderump*, the death-cart, though to all outward appearances it was her grandfather’s coach-and-four. Not that Dietrich Häuszler was to traffic shamelessly with his granddaughter, as he had with his child; he had wealth now and there was no need of offending his good taste with brutalities. But he brought her to Vienna into his world of vice, hypocrisy, and charlatanism, and four long years in this stifling atmosphere sufficed to sap her strength and bring her to an untimely end.

The tale draws to a close. One more view of the feeble, aged knight, hurrying to the side of his helpless child to tear her from the clutches of her foes. But how pitiful his errand! How ineffectual all human aid! Oh, the agony of his helplessness! Grimly the terrible Sphinx of Destiny directed her gaze upon him with those large, cold, unfathomable eyes. His head sank low upon his breast and feebly he groped about in the darkness. “Tonie, Tonie,” broke from his lips. But she understood. “We shall be together,” she whispered, “no one can do us harm.” And he too knew—knew how

utterly his last brave dash to the rescue had failed—knew too how completely it had been successful.

To those who are earnestly striving for their hearts' highest ideals, Death appears at the end as the great Comforter. This is Raabe's third answer in his *Schüdderump*. Life's course is not a golden chariot-race. It is what society makes it for the individual in spite of his enduring pursuit of eternal values. For many an unfortunate, because of the criminal disregard or failure of society's sacred duties,¹ it is but a journey to the grave where all is peace. This is not pessimism, with which Raabe has sometimes been charged. It is the unflinching utterance of the close observer. When Böcklin painted his portrait, it was with a quiet, pensive look in his eyes, listening to the dirge that grinning Death is fiddling to him from the background. Yet his hand never deserts his brush and palette. For him Death, like Raabe's *Schüdderump*, is not a specter of terror; it is but a further incentive to make life's work enduring.²

Thus Raabe's trilogy is philosophically a unit, though not such in point of form.

We have come to the close—and it was a long and hard road to travel from the ideal of beneficent activity on the part of the individual in the *Hungerpastor* through scenes of struggle and conflict with the inertia of the masses in *Abu Telfan* to the contemplation of the tragedy of unwarranted social conditions enacted in the poor-house at Krobebeck at the foot of the old Germanic Zauberberg.

To bring out the salient features of this paper the critical judgment of the reader is directed to the following points.

First, the statements of R. M. Meyer³ and W. Speck⁴ regarding the unity of the "trilogy" were evidently not meant to be exhaustive. Particularly as to Meyer it may be urged that there is no struggle portrayed against "Life's last trump card,

¹ Cf. *Der Schüdderump*, pp. 28, 277, Janke ed. "Die Canaille bleibt Herr."

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Die d. Lit. des 19. Jahrts.* (1900), p. 568: "Der Hungerpastor ist der Jüngling, der mit tausend Masten auf dem Ozean schifft; in Abu Telfan ringt er vergeblich mit der Gewöhnlichkeit, versinkt in den Sumpf der alltäglichen Hindernisse; im Schüdderump treibt still auf zerbrochenem Kahn der schiffbrüchige Greis in den Hafen. So bilden die drei Bücher wirklich eine Einheit."

⁴ *Meine Erinnerungen an Wilhelm Raabe. Daheim* Nr. 49 (1908), p. 8: "Der Hungerpastor, Abu Telfan, der Schüdderump, das Buch der Jugend, das Buch der Lebensmitte und das Buch des Alters."

Death" in Raabe's *Schüdderump*. Meyer's brief statement may be said, however, to characterize the prevailing moods of the novels, to which H. Junge¹ calls attention more clearly in pointing out the influence of Laurence Sterne.

Secondly, the Gerber theory of a unity of idea² is no longer tenable. Brandes³ protested that it would have been psychologically impossible for Raabe to write *Der Hungerpastor* with *Der Schüdderump* already conceived. The one is simple in its outlook upon life, the other deeply complex. In a chapter on *Komposition und Technik*, H. Junge⁴ traces signs of well-arranged plans of structure in most of Raabe's works and comes to the following conclusion: Wenn er eine "Idee" zum Ausdruck bringt, so kann das nur im Sinne des angeführten Wortes von Spielhagen behauptet werden; nie aber "wird die Schilderung des Lebens . . . zu einer Fabel degradiert," sondern stets bleibt jene die Hauptsache und höchstens gibt die Idee, oder besser vielleicht die Grundstimmung, die Einheit der Erzählung. This position is now confirmed by Brandes' publications from Raabe's *Tagebuch*. There *Der Hungerpastor*⁵ and *Abu Telfan*⁶ were found briefly outlined. The sequence of their conception is consequently established beyond question.

Thirdly, Brandes and Adler have attempted to establish a relationship based upon the growing maturity of the author, the three novels representing successive stages of development. Their views are open to serious objection.

Brandes,⁷ charging influence of Schopenhauer, sees Raabe lapse more and more into a period of temporary bitterness and gloom.

¹ Wilhelm Raabe, *Studien. Schriften der Lit. Gesellschaft (Bonn)*, IX, p. 131.

² Gerber, P., W. Raabe (Leipzig, 1897), p. 152: "Der gemeinsame Welt- und Lebensgrund bildet die Einheit darin. Eine neue Dichtungsform ist hiermit geschaffen"; p. 153: "Der Hungerpastor führt die Energie und die Erhebung zum Idealen auf den Welt- und Lebensgrund zurück. . . . Abu Telfan zeigt dann die Unvermeidlichkeit, die Angst und den Ausgang des Kampfes. Der Schüdderump endlich stellt beide, die Energie und die Erhebung zum Idealen und die gemeine und schlechte Wirklichkeit, vor den Schrecken und den Frieden des Todes." Cf. also W. Kammell, *22. Jahresbericht der Staats-Realschule* (Wien, 1907), p. 6: "Die grosse Romantrilogie verherrlicht den einen Gedanken: 'Alles ist eitel' und trotzdem sind es drei verschiedene Bücher."

³ Wilhelm Raabe (Berlin, 1906²), p. 10.

⁴ As above, p. 65.

⁵ *Mitteilungen* (1912), Beilage zu Nr. 3, pp. 77 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.* (1915), pp. 76 ff.

⁷ As above, p. 10.

(Es ist) "eine Einheit in dem Sinne dasz sie die Stadien seines Weges der Erkenntnis bezeichnen von der freudigen Bejahung des Lebens . . . durch den wachsenden Zweifel zur reinschmerzlichen Verneinung."

For proofs that the influence of Schopenhauer is a negligible quantity see the testimony to the contrary of Raabe himself as reported by Th. Rethwisch,¹ H. A. Krüger,² Fritz Hartmann,³ see furthermore Marie Speyer's conclusion⁴ that Raabe's attitude toward life undergoes no material change. Brandes himself admitted a change of view on the influence of Schopenhauer in 1912⁵ but maintains⁶ his former position on the trilogy as quoted above.

Adler⁷ does not find Raabe's *Schüdderump* pessimistic. He sees the insight of the author grow to the point where, rejecting his two previous attempts at finding a formula for the great struggle of life, *Der Hungerpastor* and *Abu Telfan*, he voices a satisfactory third answer, *Der Schüdderump*, by proclaiming a victory of the ideal forces over the material. "Eine Trilogie kann ich in den drei Werken nicht sehen, auch nicht in dem Sinne Gerbers," is his conclusion in surveying the three novels.

Fourthly, Helene Dose finds Raabe's theme in his trilogy to be "die innere Menschwerdung," i.e., man developing esoterically to ideal form in consecutive stages.⁸ Discovering in Raabe an idealist of the purest stamp,⁹ she entirely disregards the social aspects of Raabe's panorama of life in *Abu Telfan* and *Der Schüdderump*.¹⁰

¹ Cf. H. Junge, as above, p. 10.

² *Der junge Raabe* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 37.

³ *Wilhelm Raabe* (Hannover, 1910), p. 66.

⁴ *Raabe's Hollunderblüte* (Regensburg, Habbel, 1908), p. 43.

⁵ *Mitteilungen* (1912), Bellage, p. 87.

⁶ *Ibid.* To be inferred also from *Mitteilungen* (1915), p. 62.

⁷ *Kg.-Gym. zu Salzwedel. Progr.* (1909), p. 17.

⁸ *Mitteilungen* (1915), p. 122: "Die Gestalten Hans Unwirrachs, Leonhard Hagebuchers und Antonie Häuslers könnten in ihrer progressiven inneren Steigerung sehr gut Offenbarungen einer und derselben Individualität sein."

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 121: "Est is unverkennbar, dasz Raabe in dieser Trilogie sich als Idealist im strengsten Sinne des Wortes zeigt. Der Geist, seine Entwicklung und Steigerung, ist ihm alles, die Materie, die in dem vielfältigen Wechselspiel des Lebens sich auswirkt, ist nur Dienerin."

¹⁰ Cf. Kosch, *Menschen und Bücher* (Leipzig, 1912), p. 232: "Der Schüdderump ist aber auch eine soziale Dichtung, die tief in die Not und das Grauen der untersten Volksschichten hinableuchtet."

Abu Telfan was first planned with the title *Die Heimkehr Hagebuchers*. Says Brandes:¹

Von der nachmaligen tiefen und umfassenden Grundidee der allgemeinen Gefangenschaft in der Welt und der deutschen Heimat im besonderen und was damit zusammenhängt, von der politischen Satire auf das kleinfürstliche Deutschland der Bundestagszeit, die sich durch den ganzen Roman hindurchzieht, ist in dem Entwürfe noch nichts zu spüren. . . . Mit der Frau Claudine und dem prachtvollen Hoffräulein, Nikola von Einstein, dem "jungen Mädchen" des Entwurfs . . . zieht die ganze Residenzgesellschaft, Adel, Beamtenschaft und Militär in den Roman ein.

Thereupon the title of the novel was changed to *Abu Telfan* with the evident intention, it would seem, of more adequately designating the author's conception of social conditions in Germany in 1862.

In like manner the "Death-cart" is not a symbol of Death alone, but of Death attended by social wrong.² If this were not the case it is difficult to understand why Raabe found this brutal symbol so befitting. It is impossible to explain his choice³ or relieve the bitterness of some of his utterances⁴ by pleading a surrender to temporary periods or moments of gloom. Twenty-five years later he insisted upon the truth of his message in unequivocal terms.⁵

In fact, in looking over the critical literature on Raabe we are constantly struck by observations made that tend to confirm the impression that the charge of pessimism against him is due to his interest in the social problem. Adolf Stern⁶ says, "Der Pessimismus Raabes hat eine besondere Färbung" and attributes it to the fact that Raabe sees social values he prizes constantly endangered and sometimes destroyed by demoniacal forces of the new day.

Bartels speaks in a similar vein. Says he,⁷ "Raabe is seeking for eternal values in personality like Goethe, for it is his great ideal to

¹ *Mitteilungen* (1915), p. 79.

² Cf. *Der Schütterump*, p. 97: (der Wagen) "dessen Begleiter, die Leidenschaften, mit Zähneknirschen und Hohnlachen die eisernen Stangen und Haken schwingen; denn ihrer ist ja das Reich und die Herrlichkeit der Welt, und wer kann sich rühmen, dass er im Kampfe wider sie wirklich den Sieg davon getragen habe?"

³ Const. Bauer, *Mitteilungen* (1913), p. 137.

⁴ Helene Dose, as above, p. 123.

⁵ See the preface of his 2d ed. "unverschönert."

⁶ *Die d. Nationalliteratur* (1905), p. 149.

⁷ *Ein Vortrag* (Berlin, 1901), p. 20.

put soul into the modern Germany of colossal technical progress and magnitude." After the so-called "pessimistic" period (*Schüdderump*, 1869) he finds¹ Raabe's insight penetrating beyond the "official" Germany, not politically "official" he says, to the whole and true Germany.² "Es ist der berechtigte natürliche Pessimismus, . . . der so alt ist wie die Welt selbst."

Raabe's social and political views are briefly as follows. He was a strong and ardent supporter of the policy of centralizing power in the general government. He abhorred sectionalism. "Ich habe nur ein Vaterland, das heisst Deutschland." Within the Empire he favored states composed of free communities of citizens like the Brunswick of the days preceding 1671, das dem "angestammten" Herzog die Tore vor der Nase zuschlug.³ But he was far too deep a thinker to base his hopes of a millennium upon any state reorganization. In his first works, it is true, his protests are often directed against artificial standards upheld by class distinctions and the nobility are perhaps unduly arraigned. But later there is a change of attitude and people in every sphere are valued by their outlook upon life and by their inner worth. The Philistinism of the middle classes is now no whit less reprehensible than the arrogance of the nobility.⁴ "Es ist eine der volksläufigen Vorstellungen, dass die höheren Klassen unserer Gesellschaft den ideeleren Bestrebungen des Menschen immer noch vollkommen fremd gegenüberständen. . . . Dem ist nach meiner Erfahrung nicht so, nicht einmal im grossen Ganzen," says Raabe in his *Alte Nester*.⁵

Fifthly, Raabe presents a tragedy in his *Schüdderump* that is based upon unwarranted social conditions and not upon the "guilt" of Lessing's theory of the tragic. He is deeply sensible of the influence of environment on character. He asserts the right of the individual to inner growth and betterment of condition and condemns the tyranny of society in its enforcement of artificial standards. The following quotations will confirm this. Readers familiar with

¹ *Die d. Dichtung der Gegenwart* (1903), pp. 63 f.

² Cf. H. Hoffmann, *Die Dichtung*, Band XLIV (Berlin), pp. 41 f.

³ Cf. Fritz Hartmann, *W. Raabe* (Hannover, 1910), p. 57.

⁴ H. Junge, as above, p. 117.

⁵ P. 144.

the current theory of tragedy that the suffering of the individual contributes to the uplift of society, of which Marie Speyer says:¹ "das ist Raabe's Lebensphilosophie in der Hollunderblüte," will find in the quotation from *Abu Telfan* a distinct note of personal protest against its calm avowal and promulgation.

Ja, ist das nun nicht der krasseste Pessimismus? Wo das süsseste, reinste, edelste Geschöpf, die holde Antonie, von den schleichenden Mächten der rohen Geldgier hier vertreten durch ihren eignen Groszvater erbarmungslos vernichtet, zu Tode gequält wird.

Aber es heisst auch noch etwas ganz anderes.²

Das ist das Erfreuliche am Leben, dasz der Mensch für seine Natur kaum verantwortlich zu machen ist, und so werden wir gewisz nicht auf den Meister Dietrich Häuszler und das, was er war, und um das, was er wurde, mit zu finstern Auge und zu tiefem Stirnrunzeln blicken! Nun hat ein Barbier in einer groszen Stadt, der sich auch ein wenig aufs Frisieren versteht, Gelegenheit, allerlei zu sehen und zu hören, worüber sich nachdenkliche Betrachtungen anstellen lassen. Das Ideal tritt in erstaunlichen Formen auf, und schon in Berlin lag das Ideal für Dietrich in der Vorstellung, eine schöne Tochter zu haben und beliebig über dieselbe verfügen zu dürfen.³

(Die gnädige Frau) ist immer in ihrem Reich und Kreise geblieben und hat immer Bescheid gewusst in allen ihren Pflichten und Rechten, und damit allein schon hat sie das allerbeste Los gezogen. Ihr guten Leute hättet mich lassen sollen, wie ihr mich am Todestage der alten Hanne Altmann fandet, dann wäre ich jetzt eine fröhliche Magd und sänge vielleicht mit der Mamsell Molkemeyer meinen Tag weg. Aber der Ritter und das Fräulein, die tragen die Schuld an meinem Unglück; denn sie gaben mir den Schein, als sei ich brauchbar für die Welt, in der ich heute lebe. O der Ritter, der Ritter! ich küsse den Staub von seinen Füßen; dem Ritter danke ich all' mein Glück.⁴

O es ist ein recht süszer und erquicklicher Gedanke in allem Elend, dasz man zuletzt doch nichts weiter ist, als ein Bild in dem groszen ABCbuch der Welt, und dasz der ihr am besten diene, welcher sein Ich am Schandpfahl am nacktesten ihren Blicken, Worten, und Steinwürfen darbot.⁵

In conclusion we summarize as follows: Raabe's "trilogy" is a philosophic unit, representing at successive stages of maturity equally valuable aspects of the one great problem, What is life?

¹ As above, p. 49.

² H. Hoffmann, as above, p. 36.

³ *Schädderump*, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁵ *Abu Telfan*, p. 284.

Der Hungerpastor represents this problem for the individual in its salutary and destructive aspects of development; *Abu Telfan*, for those "unhappy fortunates" whose life is filled with some great purpose so often beyond realization, in its stern aspects of struggle and conflict; *Der Schüdderump*, in its tragic aspect, where the wholly innocent and guiltless suffer from the tyranny of unwarranted social conditions. Thus the "poetic realist" Raabe, leaving the Romanticism of his boyhood days behind him,¹ links himself in his treatment of the social problem with the great writers of the post-classical tragedy,² Grillparzer and Hebbel.

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¹ Cf. H. Junge, as above, p. 128.

² Lessing, O. E., *Grillparzer und das Neue Drama* (Leipzig, 1905), Vorwort.

DIE INDOGERMANISCHE MEDIA ASPIRATA. IV

Was liegt nun im Urgriechischen vor, Lautübertragung oder Lautentwicklung? Vielleicht ein Zusammenwirken von beiden (was auch für das Indische möglich ist).

Die Bewahrung (oder Entwicklung) des musikalischen Akzentes; das Festhalten der idg. Vokalfarben bis in sehr späte Zeit; das Fehlen aller Lautverschiebungserscheinungen; der weitgehende Verlust druckfordernder Spiranten (*s, j, w*): das sind Eigentümlichkeiten, die das Urgriechische als Sprache mit geringem Druck bei normaler Spannung (ähnlich dem heutigen Französisch) charakterisieren. Damit ist die Grundbedingung zur Verschlussbildung gegeben, wenn wir die vorgriechischen Vertreter der idg. "aspirierten Medien" als stimmlose Spiranten (in lenis-Aussprache), also als *ϕ, θ, χ* unserer Umschrift, ansehen. Dagegen ist phonetisch nichts einzuwenden. Trotzdem halte ich es für sehr möglich, ja für wahrscheinlich, dass die Entwicklung dadurch gefördert wurde, dass die vorhellenischen Sprachen Griechenlands vielleicht keine solchen stimmlosen Spiranten besaßen (es ist mir allerdings nicht gelungen, darüber etwas festzustellen), also Lautübertragung und Lautentwicklung zusammenwirkten.

Die aus Spiranten hervorgegangenen Aspiraten fielen mit den aus dem Idg. ererbten stimmlosen Aspiraten zusammen. Das ist natürlich, denn auch nach einer zum Verschlusslaut führenden Minderung kann der aus einem stimmlosen Spiranten entwickelte Laut noch mehr Druck im Verhältnis zur Spannung aufweisen als eine "reine tenuis." Ob dieses *ph, th, kh* im Urgriechischen mit weniger Spannung gesprochen wurde als *p, t, k* (im Einklang mit Meillets oben erwähnter Ansicht), lässt sich wohl nicht sicher sagen. Möglich ist es schon. Jedenfalls dürften sie um Christi Geburt als lenes gelten (wie in bair. *πhōln, khōpt, rhōnt* = *behalten, gehabt, die Hand*), denn sonst liesse sich ihre Verwandlung zu Spiranten kaum verstehen. Dass diese wie im Germanischen als Steigerung durch starken Druck aufzufassen sei, verbietet der Charakter der Sprache; dagegen ist in

jener Zeit, in der ja auch β, δ, γ zu Spiranten wurden, eine Verschlusslösung durch Spannungsminderung wohl zu verstehen. (Ich mache nebenbei auf den bezeichnenden Unterschied aufmerksam, der darin liegt, dass im Germanischen die stimmlosen Verschlusslaute zu Spiranten, aber die stimmhaften Spiranten zu Verschlusslauten werden; § 14 A erklärt das Germanische, B das Griechische.)

Wir haben also in der Aussprache des griechischen ϕ, θ, χ diese Reihenfolge zu erblicken: idg. ϕ, θ, χ > urgr. > $\pi h, \tau h, k h$ (oder > $p h, t h, k h$ > $\pi h, \tau h, k h$) > spätgr. ϕ, θ, χ , teilweise > neugr. p, t, k . Das ist ziemlich genau derselbe Vorgang wie im Germanischen in umgekehrter Reihenfolge: idg. t > germ. b > θ > δ > westgerm. d > obd. t : Lautsteigerung im Germanischen, Lautminderung im Griechischen.

Ob "der Übergang der aspirierten *tenues* in die phonetische Geltung von Spiranten auf dem Wege der Affrikation vor sich gegangen" ist (Meyer, *GrGr*², S. 287) wird sich kaum beweisen lassen. Schreibungen wie $\pi\phi, \kappa\chi$ (namentlich in älterer Zeit) können auch Versuche gewesen sein, Aspiraten auszudrücken. Affrikation ist möglich (sie findet sich auch bei den erwähnten bairischen Aspiraten: [$\phi\theta\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omega\tau$] = *behüt' dich Gott*), aber nicht notwendig, sowohl für den urgriechischen Übergang in Aspiraten, wie für den spätgriechischen Übergang in Spiranten.

Die griechische Hauchdissimilation ist jedenfalls erst eingetreten, als die idg. stimmlosen Spiranten schon $\pi h, \tau h, k h$ geworden waren, und dürfte wie im Indischen als Spannungssteigerung im Anlaut (natürlich durch Dissimilation bedingt) zu betrachten sein.

ANM.—Der schon idg. vorkommende, aber im Griechischen besonders häufige Wechsel zwischen *media* und "media aspirata" (Brugmann, *Grdr*, I, 633 f.; *GrGr*, S. 113), wie in $\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\mu\beta\omega$ — $\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\mu\phi\omega$ ist bei Annahme von alten Spiranten am leichtesten verständlich; dieser Wechsel kommt am häufigsten nach Nasalen vor, wo gewiss (durch Assimilation) stimmhafte Spiranten anzunehmen wären; diese aber wurden in dieser Stellung sehr leicht zu Verschlusslauten (durch Beibehaltung des Verschlusses des Nasals, wie im Urgemanischen).

18. ITALISCH.—Der Ansatz von idg. ϕ, θ, χ fügt sich aufs beste in die italische Lautgeschichte ein. Die auch in anderen Beziehungen auf älterer Stufe stehenden Schwesterdialekte des Lateinischen bewahren im grossen und ganzen stimmlose Spiranten, während im

Lateinischen (ähnlich wie später bei inlautenden Verschlusslauten im Romanischen) stimmhafte Umgebung stimmhafte Spiranten herbeiführt; so wurde θ zu δ , ϕ zu β , und auch χ wird wohl in dieser Stellung ursprünglich als γ zu betrachten sein. Durch Spannungssteigerung, die dem Lautstande des Lateinischen vollkommen gemäss ist, wurden δ und β weiter zu d , b (*medius, albus*). Beim velaren Spiranten trat im allgemeinen Erweiterung der Enge ein (wie im Böhmischen, Englischen, Indischen usw.), sodass sich h entwickelte (*vehō*); in konsonantischer Umgebung trat durch Assimilation der Artikulationsart auch hier Verschluss ein: *fiŋdō* < **θiŋχdō*.

Eine besondere Bemerkung verlangen Formen wie *scriptus*, *vectus* < **skriŋptos*, **uexptos*, für die man Hauchumstellung anzunehmen pflegt. Nun führt wohl im Arischen (vgl. § 15) die Entwicklung stimmhafter Spiranten in solchen Verbindungen zu etwas wie einer Umstellung, aber bei den für das Italische vorauszusetzenden stimmlosen Lauten ist ein solcher Vorgang nicht denkbar. Ein Wandel von *ft* zu *pt* findet sich zwar im Nordischen (z.B. *aptan*, *lopt* gegen got. *aftana*, *luftus*), aber im Lateinischen gibt es kein derartiges Lautgesetz; diese Formen sind offenbar Neubildungen, ausgehend von den Perfektformen *scripsi*, *vexi* und unterstützt durch Parallelen wie *dixi-dictus*.—Die Verbindung *θt* entwickelte sich anders: weil beide Konsonanten die gleiche Artikulationsstelle hatten, trat Dissimilation der Artikulationsform (Rillenbildung) ein, und es bildete sich *st* (*custos* < **kuθ-t-*, *aestas* < **aiθ-tāt-*). Das halte ich trotz des unsichern *russus* für die regelmässige Entwicklung. Die Partizipialformen unterlagen dem Einfluss der übrigen Dentalwurzeln (vgl. Sommer, *Handbuch*, S. 242 und *KE*, S. 89), unterstützt durch die Perfektformen: *iussus*, *gressus* haben sich nach *sessus* < **sed-tos*, **sed-tos* und *iussi*, *gressi* für **iustus*, **grestus* < **iuθ-tos*, **χreθ-tos* eingestellt (ebenso *fusus*, *divisus* usw.). *-sθ* wurde (wie im Germanischen) zu *st* dissimiliert: *hasta* < **χasθā*.

Die gemeinitalische Vertretung von θ durch f hat keine direkte Beziehung zu unsrer Frage, da ja gegen italisch θ niemand etwas einzuwenden hat und es sich für uns nur darum handelt, ob dieser Laut schon indogermanisch war. Auch die Entwicklung von χw (ursprünglicher Labiovelar oder Palatal vor u —vgl. Buck, *AJPh*, XI, 215) zu f im Anlaut, v im Inlaut fällt hier nicht ins Gewicht,

da der Ansatz italischer Spiranten dafür ausreicht. Ebenso fällt die von Walde (*IF*, XIX, 109) angenommene, von Sommer (*KE*, S. 50) widerlegte Hauchdissimilation in die Zeit des italischen Sonderlebens, kann also weder als beweisend noch als widerlegend gelten. Kurz, wir kommen für alle italischen Fragen mit der Annahme von ϕ , θ , χ aus, aber wir können diese Laute auf keinen Fall von stimmhaften Spiranten ableiten. Denn dass diese im Anlaut oder zwischen-sonantischen Inlaut stimmlos geworden sein sollten, wäre ganz unerhört.

So bleibt uns vom Standpunkt des Italischen zweierlei: Ascolis Annahme oder Ansatz von Spiranten, die schon in idg. Zeit stimmlos waren.

19. GERMANISCH.—Leiten wir germ. β , δ , γ aus idg. ϕ , θ , χ statt bh , dh , gh ab, so schwindet die letzte Spur von Unklarheit aus dem Kreise der germanischen Lautverschiebung. Die in den "phonetischen Bemerkungen" geschilderte Entwicklungsreihe ist dann vom Indogermanischen bis ins Oberdeutsche in der folgerichtigsten Weise durchgeführt. Damit ist ausgesprochen, dass germ. β , δ , γ nicht lediglich zum Ansatz stimmhafter Spiranten für das Indogermanische führen, sondern geradezu die Vermutung erzwingen, sie seien aus ϕ , θ , χ hervorgegangen. Die Einheitlichkeit des germanischen Lautwandels hat sicher nicht erst in der Zeit des germanischen Sonderlebens begonnen. Die historischen Belege dieser unvergleichlichen Geradlinigkeit erstrecken sich über ungefähr zwei Jahrtausende; dass aber eine vom früheren Entwicklungsgang abweichende Sprachrichtung durch Umwälzungen irgendwelcher Art (etwa durch die von Feist und Meillet vermutete Vermischung von asiatischen Indogermanen mit vorgermanischen Nordeuropäern unbekannter Herkunft) plötzlich einsetzen und dann über einen so langen Zeitraum ungestört fort dauern sollte, ist für mich wenigstens undenkbar. Man kann nicht umhin, anzunehmen, dass der Sprachgeschichte der germanischen Sonderzeit eine organisch gleiche oder ähnliche Entwicklungsrichtung schon im Indogermanischen vorhergegangen sein muss. Soweit wir einen Übergang von bh , dh , gh zu β , δ , γ überhaupt beurteilen können, muss er als Lautminderung aufgefasst werden; die weitere rein-germanische Konsonantenentwicklung aber ist eine gleichmässige Steigerung. Der Widerspruch ist unerklärlich.

Darum ist meine Auffassung die:

Wie β in got. *sibun* eine früh-germanische lenis ϕ fordert, so deutet β in germ. **βeran*, **γeβan* auf vorgermanisches ϕ . Mit den gleichen Lauten wiederholen sich eben im Germanischen immer wieder die gleichen Veränderungen. Die Reihenfolge der germanischen Lautverschiebung stellt sich daher in folgender Weise dar (die einzelnen Akte greifen natürlich zeitlich vielfach in einander über):

- | | |
|---|------------------------|
| 1. idg. $\phi, \theta, \chi >$ germ. β, δ, γ : | Spannungssteigerung. |
| 2a. idg. $p, t, k >$ germ. f, β, h | } Drucksteigerung. |
| 2b. idg. $b, d, g >$ germ. p, t, k | |
| 3a. germ. $f, \beta, \text{h} > \phi, \theta, \chi > \beta, \delta, \gamma^1$ | } Spannungssteigerung. |
| 3b. germ. $\beta, \delta, \gamma >$ westgerm. b, d, g^2 | |
| 4a. germ. $p, t, k >$ hochd. f (<i>pf</i>), z (<i>ts</i>), h (<i>k h</i>) | } Drucksteigerung. |
| 4b. westg. $b, d, g >$ hochd. π, τ, κ | |

So wechseln, ganz im Sinne der "phonetischen Bemerkungen," beide Arten der Steigerungsvorgänge gleichmässig mit einander ab—dem Auf- und Abschwanken einer Wage vergleichbar. Der erste Lautwandel ist "vorgermanisch," der zweite (samt einem Teile des dritten) umfasst die "germanische Lautverschiebung," die sich in diesem Sinne wohl über ein Jahrtausend erstreckt; der dritte ist im wesentlichen "westgermanisch," und der vierte entspricht der "hochdeutschen Lautverschiebung." Als fünfte Steigerung mag man den deutschen Wandel von θ zu δ (zu d) betrachten, eine Spannungssteigerung, die 3a wieder aufnimmt, ebenso wie 4a eine Wiederaufnahme von 2a, 4b eine Wiederaufnahme von 2b ist; 3a selbst aber bedeutet nach unserer Auffassung eine Wiederholung von 1, womit eben stimmlose Lenes-Spiranten aufgestellt sind.

Grimms Lautverschiebungskreis hat nun in jeder Hinsicht Berechtigung (vorausgesetzt natürlich, dass wir unter seinem Ausdruck "Aspiratae" Spiranten verstehen): Spirans wird zur media, media zur tenuis, tenuis zur spirans, spirans zur media und so weiter.

¹ Anfänglich nur unter den Bedingungen von Verners Gesetz, später in weiterem Umfange; siehe § 11; zu Verners Gesetz vgl. auch Gauthiot, *MSL*, XI, 193, und Verf. *JEGPh*, XI, 1.

² Teilweise, denn die Völkerwanderung unterbrach die Entwicklung, vgl. Verf. "Die deutsche Lautverschiebung und die Völkerwanderung," *JEGPh*, XVI, 1.

Hier wie anderwärts weist also das Germanische nicht eine Abirung vom indogermanischen Lautstand auf, sondern die sicherste, folgerichtigste Weiterführung, die sich denken lässt.

ANM.—Die Annahme, dass *jedes* germanische β , δ , γ aus ϕ , θ , χ kam, wirft ein Streiflicht auf germ. * γa - * βi . Ich kann mich schwer damit befreunden, * γa - von keltisch-italisch *co(m)*, sl. *kŭ* zu trennen, und * βi passt in seiner Bedeutung und Verwendung viel besser zu gr. *ἐπι*, sl. *po*- (von unregelmässigen Vokalvertretungen kommt man bei solchen Partikeln nun einmal nicht weg) als zu ai. *abhi*. Setzt man demgemäss idg. *k*, *p* als Anlaut an, so hätten wir anzunehmen, dass germ. β , δ , γ in diesen proklitischen Stellungen ebenso wie im Inlaut schon sehr früh zu lenes wurden; germanisch * χa -, * ϕi wären dann ebenso behandelt worden wie idg. * χed - (got. *gitan*), * ϕer - (got. *bairan*) oder wie germ. β , δ , γ unter Verners Gesetz: der Anlaut wurde stimmhaft. Das deckt sich zwar nicht genau mit Bugges Ausdehnung von Verners Gesetz auf den Anlaut, kommt aber seiner Anschauung im Grund ziemlich nahe.

20. INDOGERMANISCH.—Soweit in vorgeschichtlicher Sprachforschung von einem Beweis die Rede sein kann, glaube ich gezeigt zu haben, dass dem Indogermanischen nicht stimmhafte Aspiraten, sondern stimmlose Spiranten zukommen. Ob diese in sehr früher Urzeit als fortes zu denken sind (die vielleicht gar noch früher aus Verschlusslauten hervorgegangen waren), entzieht sich unserer Beurteilung. Für die Zeit der Sprachabzweigung haben wir jedenfalls schwache Spiranten anzunehmen. Im Armenischen und Germanischen sind dieselben durch Spannungssteigerung bei normalem Druck zu β , δ , γ und weiterhin zu *b*, *d*, *g* geworden. Im Italischen bleiben sie vorerst unverändert (vielleicht teilweise als fortes) erhalten, später aber tritt im lateinischen Inlaut jene Minderung ein, die in der Folgezeit im Romanischen auch Verschlusslaute erfasst. Griechisch verwandelt die Laute durch Druckminderung bei bleibender oder wachsender Spannung zu *ph*, *th*, *kh*, möglicherweise unter Mitwirkung von Lautübertragung.

Für das Keltische, Baltisch-Slavische, Albanesische, Iranische geben uns Assimilationsvorgänge die Gewähr, dass ihren *b*, *d*, *g* gleichfalls β , δ , γ vorausgegangen sein müsse; theoretisch wäre ja ein unmittelbarer Übergang von ϕ , θ , χ nicht undenkbar; er käme bei sehr schwachem Druck und normaler Spannung durch gleichzeitigen Verschluss in Glottis und Ansatzrohr zustande, aber sichere Belege

für das tatsächliche Vorkommen dieses Lautwandels (ohne Unterstützung durch Nachbarlaute) kenne ich nicht. Auch werden in jenen sehr frühen Zeiten die Sprechgewohnheiten der einzelnen indogermanischen Völker noch nicht so sehr verschieden gewesen sein. Schliesslich spricht das Indische entschieden für die Annahme stimmhafter Spiranten als Vorstufe von *bh, dh, gh*, denn sowohl für *φ, θ, χ* wie für *b, d, g* (das überdies mit idg. *b, d, g* zusammengefallen wäre) würden *bh, dh, gh* weder durch Lautübertragung noch durch Lautentwicklung eingetreten sein. Wir kommen also zu dem Ergebnis, dass idg. *φ, θ, χ* wohl schon in ursprachlicher Zeit zur Stimmhaftigkeit neigten. Sprachen, die heute noch durch Glottisspannung charakterisiert sind (Keltisch und die Satemsprachen ausser Armenisch) haben den Übergang sehr früh, die druckstarken Lautverschiebungssprachen erst später, Griechisch und (Ur-) Italisch gar nicht durchgeführt. Das Uritalische ist stabil, beim Griechischen überwiegt Spannung im Ansatzrohr.

Es ist anzunehmen, dass dieser Unterschied als dialektische Eigentümlichkeit schon in die idg. Zeit zu verlegen ist. Vielleicht haben wir sogar an eine der von Zupitza (KZ, XXXVII, 387) angenommenen Ausspracheschwankungen zu denken. Dennoch ist aus praktischen Gründen die Annahme eines einheitlichen Zeichens zu empfehlen, und es scheint mir, dass sich *φ, θ, χ* ganz gut eignen. Wir hätten unter ihnen schwache stimmlose Spiranten zu verstehen, bei denen wir annehmen, dass sie in manchen idg. Dialekten schon vor der Sprachentrennung stimmhaft geworden sein mögen. Ich schlage also vor, beispielsweise **φerō*, **φrālēr*; **θē-*, **θuχātēr*; **ueχō*, **θeiχōs*; **χostis*, **steiχō*; **χwermós*, **sneiχws* zu schreiben und diese Laute wie deutsch *f, ch*, engl. stimmloses *th* auszusprechen, die ja ziemlich als lenes zu bezeichnen sind. Es kommt mir vor, dass das Indogermanische dadurch ein vertrauterer Gesicht bekommt. Die sonst nur in südost-asiatischen Sprachen vorkommenden *bh, dh, gh*, die der Aussprache aller europäischen Völker gründlich widerstreben, werden durch Laute ersetzt, die zu diesen passen. Der indogermanische Konsonantenstand ist auf einmal namentlich dem italischen und dem germanischen aufs engste verwandt—jenem statisch, diesem dynamisch, möchte man sagen, indem er dort beibehalten, hier nach feststehender Richtung weitergebildet wird—weiterfließt. Es lässt

sich kaum vermeiden, diesen "Fluss" der germanischen Entwicklung auch nach oben zu verfolgen, seine Quelle in die indogermanische Zeit zu versetzen. Das bedeutet geradezu, dass ich vermute, dass schon im Indogermanischen Lautverschiebungserscheinungen bestanden, wenn es auch kaum möglich sein wird, mit Ausnahme der Steigerung von ϕ , θ , χ zu β , δ , γ bestimmte Tatsachen darüber zu finden—es sei denn die im Anhang vermutete Entwicklung der aspirierten *tenues*.

ANM.—Wie in den Abschnitten über Indisch und Italisch angedeutet, sind bei der Annahme von idg. ϕ , χ , θ gewisse kombinatorische Lautänderungen, die sonst der Ursprache zugeschrieben werden, in die Einzelsprachen zu verweisen. "*ddh*" erscheint arisch, slavisch usw. als $d\delta > zd$ (Dissimilation), das sich nach einzelsprachlichen Lautgesetzen weiterentwickelt. Auch für Bartholomäus Gesetz wird sich ursprachliche Herkunft kaum erweisen lassen. Die Entwicklung etwa von γt zu γd , ai. *gdh*, ist, wie oben gezeigt, ganz natürlich, kann aber nicht in die Zeit versetzt werden, als noch stimmlose Spiranten gesprochen wurden. Die ausserordentlich grossen Schwierigkeiten der bisher angenommenen Entwicklungen verschwinden bei Annahme von Spiranten mit einzelsprachlicher Behandlung von selbst, und ich suche vergebens einen Punkt zu finden, der abgesehen von dem über das Indische und Italische Gesagte noch einer Erklärung bedürfte.

ANHANG.

DIE TENUIS ASPIRATA.—Es ist anzunehmen, dass eine auf Druck beruhende Lautsteigerung nicht den ganzen Wortschatz einer Sprache auf einmal erfasst, sondern in Wörtern oder Stellungen von besonderm Nachdruck beginnt, sich allmählich über den sprachlichen Durchschnitt verbreitet und zuletzt Wörter oder Stellungen mit geringstem Ton erreicht. Nachdrucksverstärkung von Konsonanten ist uns ja aus germanischem Sprachgebrauch bekannt genug—ich erinnere nur an Wilhelm Buschs "*tu tu tu verrücktes Weib!*"

Wenn nun nach Ausweis des Griechischen und Indischen stimmlose Verschlusslaute von zwei Druckgraden dem Indogermanischen zugeschrieben werden müssen, so drängt sich mir wenigstens der Verdacht auf, dass die druckstärkeren, also "aspirierten" Laute vielleicht nichts weiter waren als Verstärkungen der "reinen *tenues*"—dass sie also Vorläufer jener Bewegung darstellen, die im Germanischen und Armenischen als Lautverschiebung bezeichnet wird. Es spricht Verschiedenes dafür. Schon darauf ist Gewicht zu legen, dass der Unterschied zwischen reinen und aspirierten *tenues* am weitaus deutlichsten bei den Dentalen belegt ist (vgl. Zubaty, KZ, XXXI, 1). Wie das Germanische zeigt, pflegen Lautsteigerungen

dieser Art in der Reihenfolge Dental-Labial-Velar vor sich zu gehen; vgl. § 17. Beim Dental wäre mithin, könnte man annehmen, zur Zeit der frühesten Sprachentrennung die Steigerung schon am weitesten gegangen und am festesten geworden.

Das Indische hat seinen Stand an aspirierten *tenuis* sicher durch den Einfluss einheimischer Sprachen, in denen der Unterschied zwischen der aspirierten und reinen *tenuis* dem Lautgefüge angehört, bedeutend vermehrt. Darauf deutet die Tatsache hin, dass wir diese Laute häufig bei Namen einheimischer Pflanzen, Tiere, Speisen usw. finden (z.B. *kūṭheras*, *kūṭhas*, *pāthā*, Pflanzen, *pāthīnas*, ein Fisch, *khalas*, *khaḍas*, Speisen). Auszuscheiden sind die zahlreichen Wörter, in denen sich anscheinend durch ein indisches Lautgesetz Aspirata nach *s* einstellte (vgl. Sommer, *KE*, S. 65; ich hatte das Gleiche schon 1912 bemerkt und damals über 50 Belege gesammelt, die ich vielleicht später einmal veröffentliche). Es bleibt aber immer noch eine Anzahl von Wörtern, in denen die Aspiraten auf Nachdruck hinzudeuten scheinen: Fragewörter wie *kathām*, *kathā*; Demonstrativa wie *ithām*, *ithā*; Bestätigung: *khālu* "freilich"; Wörter, die Härte, Rauheit ausdrücken: *kathīnas*, *kharas*, *khadati*; vielleicht gar Wörter, die mit Kampf in Verbindung stehen (?): *makhas* "Kampf," *rathas* "Wagen," *ṣaphas* "Huf," *nakham* "Kralle," *ṣakham* "Ast, Keule."

Vielleicht wird man nicht geneigt sein, auf diese unsichern indischen Beispiele viel Gewicht zu legen; doch wird man sich wohl der Tatsache nicht entziehen können, dass in gewissen Verbalendungen die Aspirata *th* auf grösseren Nachdruck hinweist. Kock (*KZ*, XXXIV, 581) nimmt sogar an, dass in den Endungen *th* und *t* wechseln könnten "je nachdem das betreffende Wort im Satze akzentuiert oder unakzentuiert war." Jedenfalls stehen die absoluten und konjunkten Endungen zu einander im Verhältnis von mehr oder minder nachdrücklichen Wortteilen; *-the* verhält sich zu *-te* wie *-ti* zu *-t*. Über das *-tha* der zweiten Sing. Perf. weiss ich nichts Bestimmtes zu sagen (sollte vielleicht darin ein Gegensatz gegen die schwächere Partizipialendung *-to* liegen?—Im ai. Dual ist die Anredeform (2. Person) gegenüber der anaphorischen Form (3. Person) meist durch Aspirata ausgezeichnet; stand vielleicht dem *-tha* des Perfekts auch einmal eine 3. Person mit *t* gegenüber)?

Bezeichnend ist auch das Vorherrschen des *th* in Medialendungen (entsprechend dem Stärkeverhältnis *-tai*: *-ti*), so dem *-thās* des ai. Mediums Impf. und Aor. und den griechischen Endungen *-μεθα*, *-θε*, *-σθον*, *-σθην*, *-σθων*, *-σθας*—Endungen, die grossenteils auch schweren Vokalismus zeigen. Ferner finden wir es in gr. Passivaorist. Ob dieser von den eben genannten *σθ*-Endungen ausgegangen ist (Collitz, *Schw. Prät.*, S. 213) oder auf Intensivbildungen nach Art von lat. *iactō*, *captō* beruht, lasse ich dahingestellt, aber jedenfalls gehört er gleich dem Medium in die Kategorie der gewichtigen Formen, wie ja auch wieder der lange Endungsvokal zeigt.

Dass sich der Unterschied zwischen den aspirierten und den reinen *tenues* gerade im ai. und gr. erhielt, ist nicht zu verwundern. Im Indischen wurde er dadurch gestützt, dass derselbe Unterschied in den nicht-arischen einheimischen Sprachen bestand. Ob für das Griechische etwas Ähnliches gilt, können wir nicht wissen; aber die Entwicklung der stimmlosen Spiranten des Idg. zu stimmlosen Aspiraten musste natürlich auch ererbten Lauten dieser Art Bestand gewähren. In allen andern Sprachen ist der Unterschied wieder verschwunden, und zwar im Armenischen und Germanischen dadurch, dass im Laufe der Zeit *alle* *tenues* verstärkt wurden, in den andern Sprachen aber dadurch, dass die aspirierten *Tenues* ihre Aspiration wieder verloren, also in ähnlicher Weise wie verschiedene Laute des Oberdeutschen (z.B. *kχ*) rückentwickelt wurden.

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